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Mason and I are contemplating writing about the theory and practice of poker collusion in more detail. The fact is that colluding expertly is as difficult as playing expertly, especially if you are trying to avoid detection. In a nutshell, colluders will sometimes play their hands differently than they would have normally, either because they know cards that are folded or because a partner is in the pot with them. Of course most colluders are not very good at it.
Both the pros and cons to our writing about the subject are pretty obvious. The main con is that we would be helping thieves. One pro would be that players would know what to look for. So would internet poker sites who have the advantage of being able to see folded cards.
Though we do not consider ourselves bound by the results of any vote, we would like to hear your opinions as to whether or not the time has come to write in more detail about this stuff.
In the area of game theory, the subject of coalitions (in economics, in geopolitics, in warfare, even in organized crime) is widely discussed. To me, there really isn't that much difference between "collusion" in poker and "coalition" in other competitive arenas. They have the same essence in that both involve two or more competitive entities making coordinated competitive moves in order to achieve benefits that a single competitor could never achieve individually. Since the subject of poker collusion is already out in the open anyway, you and Mason might as well write a treatise on it. Someone will sooner or later. It might as well be both of you. A "coalition" between Mason and you is the best thing that can happen as far as the subject of "collusion" in poker is concerned.
You could call it: Partner Poker. It could be spread on the floor.
"Partner Poker". I have to admit that spreading this game on the floor would be a very creative idea. Sort of like doubles tennis. If I were a poker room manager, I would definitely give this concept a shot!
....to play poker on the internet without being a member of a collusion team would be like being a hyena that chooses to hunt alone, as opposed to being a part of a pack......
.....it is unnatural and goes against the laws of nature.....
.....team versus team competition should be the norm in internet poker.....
.....anyone who plays internet poker as an individual as opposed to being part of a team is an idiot who is not maximizing his profits.....
.....anyone who tries to stop collusion is anti-capitalist and anti-freedom......
........collusion is the rule of internet poker..... if you don't think so, you are naive..... .....collusion play is what internet poker is all about.....
.....i cannot wait to read your treatise...
In response to:Posted By: truth finder and seeker
Date: Saturday, 1 July 2000, at 7:33 p.m.
Who responded to: Should We Write A Treatise On Collusion? (David Sklansky):
Truth Finder & Seeker -- I wonder where you are coming from. Are you the Archie Bunker of Poker(dumb conservative) or like the gifted actor who played Archie, i.e., an extreme liberal and not-so-liberal very extreme frugal type at the studio commissary when treating the stage hands to a late dinner when they put in long overtime hours. Or maybe you are just an nice average American?
You don't have to be a "brain" to realize that cheaters or wantabe cheaters will infest Internet Poker. Are you a cynic(unrealistic realist) that treats poker and capitalism as an evil thing? If you think poker is evil then stay away from it. But(in my opinion) you are right about cheating.
There will be cheating on Internet Poker and people would be morally wise to avoid playing Internet Poker for real money. Why? Because in spite of the cheating, there will be a relatively few semi-honest very good players who can still beat the games("only-game-in-town right"). How? The semi-honest foxes realize who the cheaters are and use them to their advantage. The semi-honest players are honest players in the sense that they do nothing wrong other than play in games where they suspect cheating. These semi-honest very good players will usually avoid the traps set up by the cheater; they will know when to release a hand. In spite of being cheated some by the cheaters, the semi-honest expert can still show a profit by beating the sheep in the game.Why? Because the majority of the Internet Players will be like sheep and you know what happens to sheep. But talented cheaters should make a killing.
Good cheaters can probably make a killing by just knowing what hands their partners have and save a ton on saved bets. This form of cheating will be very difficult to detect and would require sophisticated techniques to expose it. Cheaters could also occasionaly jam pots in certain situations when they have the nuts. This technique would work well in HI_Low games(Omaha 8 & Stud Hi-Lo). But they would probably have to limit this technique to about once per session for obvious reasons.
....it's time to stop calling "collusion" in internet poker cheating....
.....the reason it shouldn't be regarded as cheating is because it is an unavoidable rule of nature in that poker "room" in cyberspace that everyone must take as a given each time they play....
....an unexpected thing that internet poker will do is to make poker strategizing and tactic making much richer and multidimensional than it currently is by adding to it the distinctions of team(s) versus team(s) play, team(s) versus individual(s) play, and individual(s) versus team(s) play, in addition to the more traditional brick and mortar play of individuals versus individuals.....
....these added dimensions and distinctions to poker are unprecendented and could be fully possible as the norm only after the creation of cyberspace.....
.....before the internet this was not possible......
.....in the brick and mortar world, they are the domain only of a few people that are rightly called cheaters....
....but in cyberspace it cannot be cheating as it is the norm that everyone has complete access this doing.....
....internet poker and the norm of collusion that accompanies it is an opportunity to be embraced not something to stay away from....
....I hope Sklansky and Malmuth do write a book on poker collusion and provide specific strategic and tactical advice on individual versus team, team versus team, team versus individual and so on.....
....a collusion book that does not cover all of these perspectives would be incomplete.......
Team cheaters goes back to the beginning of poker -- it is not new. In 1958 playing above at my cousin's house in Columbus, Ohio: I witnessed teams of cheaters playing against each other. My cousins teams consisted of three guys and the other team was comprised of three Airforce guys from a local Sac base (then Lockbourn Air Base - now Rickenbacker Field). May the best team win. My cousin refunded my losses at the end of the session.
At that time I also played above a saloon on the south side of Columbus where a team of three hillbillies have various ways of cheating. They were crude but their opposition wasn't too observant. They used marked cards, dealing seconds, stacked decks(using the excuse of going to the John to doctor the deck), and even holding out a set of trips and throwing some cards on the floor.
In my opinion, the majority of people who regularly read 2+2 articles do not need to collude to beat the game. So I think the demographic in consideration (i.e. serious students of the game who make a living through cheating) is not one to be excessively concerned about.
Besides, any essay which could put a damper on the series of "I've been cheated!" posts on the Internet forum can't be all bad.
Yes, I'd love to see a book by you on the subject of conlusion. Ignoring this form of cheating will do little. Ignorance is seldom a good stradegy.
A book on other forms cheating techniques wouldn't be a bad idea either. Haven't seen anything modern in some time.
You guys aren't making this any easier. My reference to Andy Morton was actually a subtle hint about one aspect to collusion that few understand. I agree that others understand the subject better in its entirety.
heres a question.
if everyone collaborated against you by playing all their hands to the river every time, what would your optimal strategy be? and could you win, as a practical matter?
now, how can they improve?
now, reduce the collaborators numbers, and how does this affect things?
brad
Yes.
If we assume (safely, I think) that most people do not cheat, does it not follow that the number of people helped to protect themselves from cheaters will be greater than the number of people who improve their cheating skills. I wouldn't want to try to put hard numbers to this, but I think protected/cheater would be huge.
There is a lot of information available on cheating at gambling games, some of it good, although much is absolute crap, e.g., "magician tricks" presented as "gambling moves" that could never be used in an actual game, or outdated material that no longer applies to the way the game is played in the real world. Books such as "Cheating at Blackjack" by Dustin D. Marks have not caused an explosion of cheating in the pits.
I, for one, have avidly read everything I could ever find regarding cheating because I have been a lifelong player. For example, I was somewhere between five and seven years old when I realized that the Old Maid in our beat up old deck had a unique smudge on it's back (that I did not put there). By the age of nine, I was ordering the loaded dice and marked cards from the ads in comic books, not to cheat, but to see what they looked like and how they worked so that I could protect myself from being cheated out of my lunch money. The knowledge served me well, allowing me to profit from running craps games in college and in the army, playing backgammon for a living, becoming a professional blackjack player, and leading to a 20 year career in the casinos of Las Vegas as a dealer, Floorman, Pit Boss, Shift Boss, and Surveillance Supervisor. After all these years, I still want to know as much as I can about what they might be doing to me, and what I can do about it. Poker being my main game these days, the prospect of a Sklansky/Malmuth treatise on the subject is ... (unable to find the right word, but it's a good one :)
I think educating the internet site operators is also a substantial positive. In my contacts with Paradise Poker Support (all pleasantly prompt, helpful, and literate), they have not really exhibited any knowledge of poker.
Suggestion: Since the driving force behind your post appears to be the current wave of internet paranoia (which I am also experiencing; my win rate online is significantly lower than in live games), you may want to consider bringing in someone with a great deal of technical knowledge of the internet, perhaps even someone recruited from the hacker world, to help either quell or justify the concerns that some people are able to see other players' cards.
The point of all this rambling? Knowledge = Protection
As has been mentioned in some previous posts we want to read some essays or a book on Big-Bet play.
I understand that a lot of the decisions that are made come from a psychological evaluation, that is they vary tremendously from hand to hand depending on your understanding of the opposing player's emotional state and strategic outlook. However, apparently there are some considerations in Big-Bet that can be discussed as principles and that have not been written about already, e.g. your mention of not raising unless you are already aware of whether you will fold or go all-in in the event of a re-raise. Patri on r.g.p., in his follow-up post to playing in the $200-$400 blind game also had some interesting thoughts about how to play depending on stack size in relation to the blinds. This is what you've got an audience for. Hey, I know, maybe Ray Zee has something to say on the subject too...
No!!!
Encouraging collusion is a bad idea. The information will benefit the cheats more than it will benefit the average player.
The online poker sites should have the motivation to keep their sites clean. They should be willing to pay experts like you to police the games. Online poker is doomed unless they take the initiative to police their sites.
The industry needs a group of independent experts to inspect and certify online poker and casino sites. The posters on 2+2 and rgp are justifiably concerned about numerous issues, not just collusion. You should consider bringing such a group of experts together.
I assume that a treatise would be a theoretical work.
I have thought about what would constitute an effective expert collusion strategy, and the issues become fairly complicated quickly. Most people's posts here touch on the very simple notions, but show significant lack of understanding of the type of considerations that an expert strategy would entail.
I guess a strong negative would be that people who are too lazy (or lack the required knowledge) to develop an effective collusion strategy would have a short-cut if you wrote a work on the subject. There are many players without ethics who would try to implement your teachings.
Considering the extent to which 2+2 goes to completely research a subject, I'm sure you would have to talk with people who had run successful *teams*. I personally think that cheating of this nature is reprehensible and would discourage anything but information on *how to catch cheats* being made available.
This being said, if you write it, I'll buy a copy immediately.
David,
Usually I just lurk here, but this one, I feel the need to respond to.
When I was a teenager, several kids I knew had copys of "The Anarchist Cookbook". For the uninitiated, its a book that gives "recipies" for making weapons, poisons, drugs, etc, out of easily attainable "ingrediants".
None of us would have thougt to "cook" any of these things if we didn't have the book, but since we had it, I know a kid who blew a finger off with a homemade bomb, and another who spilled his homemade LSD on his hands, and was never quite the same afterwards. After reading Abbie Hoffman's "Steal This Book", I myself ran a couple of sucessful scams, just to see if his tactics would work.
Now I read 2+2 books, and your tactics seem to work quite well. I have never cheated at poker. But after reading your collusion treatise, I just might want to see how well the tactics work. What if I decide I could double my hourly rate now that you have taught me to cheat?
I am an honest person, and I (probobly) would decide that my peace of mind is more important that any money I could make by cheating. But I'm sure others would take full advantage of the information you provide, without a second thought.
I don't have my copy of TOP handy, but in it you say something like "If I know something about the game that my opponent doesn't, and he isn't willing to learn, or can't understand, then I take his money". I would hate to think that in five years I will have to know, understand, and apply coullusion concepts to make a living at holdem. I think I'd rather get a "job".
IMHO... B$
Since Mason's never been cheated it would be impossible for him to write from personal experience. That leaves the theoretical only, a poor substitute for real world encounters with the enemy.
Perhaps a Sklansky and Caro book would be a better combination of talent on this subject.
When I said that I was never cheated, I was referring to organized collusion in a public cardroom. This clarification was written on RGP in detail. When Abdul brings this up, he always neglects this point.
You didn't say that in your Poker Digest article. You only later posted on rec.gambling.poker that when you wrote in Poker Digest "I believe I have never been cheated," you didn't mean "I believe I have never been cheated." Hope this helps. (Can anyone dig up that old Poker Digest issue, about #3, and give the context around the quote?)
-Abdul
Yes, I think such a treatise would be very worthwhile. You may want to check out Nolan Dalla's article on this subject that he wrote for Cardplayer magazine a couple of years ago. He discussed whipsawing, raising out legitimate hands, etc. You could make a valuable contribution here in a little understood area similar to what Mike Caro has done for tells.
I for one don't understand what you think you have to offer. To my knowledge you or Mason have never played on line and Mason publicly states that cheating is practically nonexistent. (Although I know he actually believes differently.)
You have also stated that you are theoretically very weak regarding computers. How could you speak with expertise on that subject.
You MAY have something to offer regarding collusion in live games but it seems to me most people want to know the truth regarding on line play.
As a side note I have had serious concerns concerning on line play. It doesn't feel right to me and I don't trust it. In the case of playing on line, what you CAN'T see CAN hurt you.
"To my knowledge you or Mason have never played on line and Mason publicly states that cheating is practically nonexistent. (Although I know he actually believes differently.)"
That's an interesting statement, Banana Man, why don't you explain to everyone exactly what it is I believe.
"To my knowledge you or Mason have never played on line and Mason publicly states that cheating is practically nonexistent. (Although I know he actually believes differently.)"
That's an interesting statement, Banana Man, why don't you explain to everyone exactly what it is I believe.
It's Banana Bob--not Man.
I would explain it but then I would be revealing my true identity. I don't want you to know who I am. You may be able to guess anyway. Doesn't matter. I post anonymously because I have no ego stake involved. Maybe I will expound later. I stand by my statement. (You know it's true.)
PS David Sklansky knows it's true too.
Well Banana Brain, what you're saying isn't true, and if you want to have any credibility you are just going to have to tell us who you are.
I am very uncomfortable with this idea. Given that expert collusion does not appear to be a common problem in live casino games, I do not think we need a treatise on collusion. I have no doubt that if such a treatise were published, it would be used by some cheaters to cheat more effectively. More ominously, it could contribute to the perception that collusion is common in poker, causing some players to avoid the game; other players may be enticed to join the ranks of the cheaters. I vote no.
I vote yes.Over the years I have seen a few things at the tables, that did not seem on the up and up.An expert's treatice would be beneficial for serious students of the game.
No. I am afraid that the effect of you publishing a good manual for collusion would both make collusion more common, and those who currently collude would get better at it.
However, if you think that players are frequently encountering compitent colluders already in today's world then there would be more benefit for players trying to defend against collusion. I hope that this is not the case. If compitent collusion is very rare today, then most of the benefit would go to colluders.
Steve
It is almost inconceivable that present day colluders understand the intricate theoretical considerations involved in the expert practice of their trade. There is no chance that anyone would know this subject better than me (Andy Morton might have come close.) Do these two facts change any minds among those who voted yes?
If David does know things about collusion that present day colluders don't, it would certainly be better for us ethical players if David and Mason did not teach the cheaters new tricks. Think of the physicists who regretted building the bomb.
Could David and Mason just write a treatise about how to detect *known* methods of collusion? (If they became known as the gurus of collusion detection, casinos would become eager to hire them in that capacity.)
By the way, David's reference to Andy Morton doesn't support his claim that he's the leading authority on theoretical collusion. Andy's poker mentors know far more about poker theory than Andy did. After all, Andy's Ph.D. was in Organic Chemistry, not Physics. :-)
Maybe write it as a scientific paper and publish it in an obscure journal. Then tell us where it is.
That should pretty much shut out most of the rif-raf.
D.
Collusion is the gun that criminals use to harm innocent citizens with. Knowledge about collusion strategies and counter strategies is the gun that the innocent citizen uses to protect himself and his family from those armed criminals.
If there is a defence to collusion other than leaving the table, your treatise will be valuable, if not what use is it?
My vote would depend on the following: Will the honest players be able to save more money because they would know how to protect themselves or will they lose more money because there will be more colluders or the colluders will improve in their ability to collude. I vote for the answer that would protect the honest player. Other than that, I would very much like to have the knowledge that would be contained in the treatise. By the way, in what medium would the treatise be published?
Egad! By all means write something on how to detect collusion patterns, but don't spill too many beans. The last thing we need is for the cheats to become more adept... or to learn how to best disguise their chicanery.
I still vote YES. The phrase "present day colluders" is the key. How quickly are the teams gaining knowledge? How many of their victims have not only the mental capacity, but also the time to do the thinking that you would put into this work? Research for its' own sake can be fun and rewarding, but it has a chance of becoming truly useful when it is shared.
The fear of "teaching" colluders seems to be the overwhelming reason for the NO votes. I wonder how many of them were emotional responses to the fact that the first reply to your original post was from a cheater. In fact, I have noticed a peculiar pattern to the voting. ALL of the YES votes were presented with lucid, logical thinking, and all but one of the NO votes were either based entirely on the fear of educating cheaters, or were irrational/illogical conclusions arrived at from baseless/irrelevant assumptions. The rational NO voter was rather wishy-washy, giving convincing arguments against his own decision. [insert rant concerning dangers of unqualified voters in democratic process]
I own dozens of books on cheating, scams, cons, etc., yet I have never cheated. I have demonstrated many of the things I have learned to hundreds of people over the years and have never had one say "I'm gonna run out and try that", but I have had people (urgently) say "Stop. Why are you showing me this? I don't want to know this." From this, I conclude that most people are honest, and that many people, for reasons I don't comprehend, have a fear of knowledge that seems to them somehow dark or dangerous. I cannot, however, conclude that because of those fears we should stop teaching physics because somebody might build a bomb. Somebody damn well better build a bomb because the other guys have them, even if theirs don't work as well as ours, and even though they might find out how we build ours. [insert rant concerning censorship, secret classification of "dangerous" knowledge, who decides, etc.]
So, yes. Please. Do the work. Share the work. The internet truly is a wild and woolly new frontier, and on any frontier people must take a greater deal of responsibility for their own well-being than is necessary in a more civilized place. You have the ability and the opportunity to help these pioneers achieve success in taming that frontier, not to mention the fun you're gonna have thinking all those new thoughts.
{gain * honest players) / (gain * cheaters) => 1
Increased knowledge of collusion is inevitable, especially in the time of Internet poker.
Writing a treatise will only accelerate awareness and knowledge. The process of the discussion of collusion techniques has already begun and will continue with or without a treatise. So will colluders' learning and experience curve. The hard part will be for those who wish to detect or deter collusion to be able to keep up.
Whether such a treatise will have greater value to colluders or to anti-colluders is a key question. Also worth consideration is whether it might be more desirable to give anti-collusion advice to establishments without giving every little would-be colluder a blueprint. If honest players also know the details of skilled collusion techniques, would they truly be able to do much to detect or prevent it, especially in an online environment? I doubt players could help police these games very effectively; it would be more the province of the site which has access to information about folded hands, etc.
Whether such a treatise is written or not, collusion will be increasingly on the minds of many. Countermeasures except against flagrant collusion may be largely ineffective. Algorithms sophisticated enough to detect subtle collusion would be very hard to develop and even harder to utilize. Collusion may eventually be what kills internet poker. Right now I think the problem is small enough to be overcome. But I also think the colluders are bound to grow in sophistication, experience and number unless the sites keep pace with their software and algorithms, and have an expert on hand to analyze plays.
Weighing it all up, and reading all the above posts now, I have to agree with the argument that it would help the colluders more than those wishing to detect or deter collusion---especially those colluders who would never have been able to get good at it on their own. You might easily help those colluders who would otherwise be losing colluders to become winning colluders.
Like any other scam, once the methods are made available to the general public the scam usually fades away. Of course, it will continue to work on the lazy ones who don't want to make the effort to educate themselves about the pitfalls, but that's their problem. The 11 o'clock news is always showing how supposedly legitimate businesses are ripping off their customers. One could argue that they are only showing other businesses more ways to screw people. Well, the people that weren't clued in do get screwed but everyone else who saw the report is a little better equipped when facing that situation. Just the fact that you guys have written it would put a spotlight on the problem. Ane when you shine a spotlight on cockroaches they scurry away.
If you're taking advanced sales let me know where to send the check.
I'd rather you didn't. While it is true that there are more non-colluders to benefit than colluders, it is surely the case that colluders will benefit more by reading how to do it effectively than non-colluders will benefit from reading of any counter-strategies which I imagine would be more difficult to implement.
Another point is that colluders will, by definition, play in many more games in which colluding is going on than non-colluders (does that make any sense ?).
Finally, however interesting the subject may be theoretically, you should consider your reputation. Without wanting to be too much of a suck-up, my impression gained from your books and this forum is that you are honest, and that you do not hold back on information as much as other poker authors if at all. Releasing a book or essay which, whatever the intention, could easily be used as a "how to cheat better" manual would cost you more in terms of lost reputation (and future sales) than it would earn in $$$. The only way you can do this is successfully is to make it 100% "how to identify and play against colluders".
Andy.
Yes.
The people that currently collude well will be more identifiable.
The people that currently collude poorly probably lack the talent / discipline to collude more successfully, even if you give them more / better information.
It would be valuable information to players looking to protect themselves. Human nature being what it is, I have a pessimistic feeling that some percentage of people who set out to be pros and fail turn to collusion as a last resort.
Bob D.
"The people that currently collude poorly probably lack the talent / discipline to collude more successfully, even if you give them more / better information."
I think that this statement bears careful consideration. I do not agree. I am assuming that there is a range of effectiveness regarding collusion, just like there is in playing poker.
If the publication of quality poker books can frequently transform slight losers into slight winners, and occasionally into experts, then wouldn't a quality collusion treaty do the same for colluders?
Did the publication of HPFAP make hold'em a tougher game to beat in most public cardrooms? If so, then it scares me what impact a good book on collusion would do to games accross the country and on the internet.
While it may be true that knowledge of how to collude well will eventually become relatively common, that might not happen for a long time. When it does happen, then that would be the time to "shine a spotlight" on the techniques.
Normally, I would favor open sharing of knowledge, as I enjoy learning. So my resistence here is a rare exception.
A counterpoint to my argument is that common knowledge of collusion would create a lot of "collusion cops" in cardrooms (online and live players). This would make it almost impossible to collude well. However, I fear that only a few would be good at it, and the benefit would not keep games generally clean.
Steve
Steve Fiete asks:
"Did the publication of HPFAP make hold'em a tougher game to beat in most public cardrooms?"
Maybe, but I don't think we can just assume so.
Certainly many players who would have played public poker anyway now play better public poker.
But how many players who would not have played public poker, or who would have played less public poker, continue to play because they are armed with a little information?
How many players are chronic losers who lack the skill and discipline to implement what they read?
How many people play craps and roulette, fully aware of the casino advantage? They just want to gamble.
I'm not saying HPFAP hasn't made the game tougher, only that I don't think we can simply assume so.
Bob D.
If you had an expert three card monty dealer show how the scam works are you teaching people how to do it or what to watch for?
David,
I vote yes. I think it is virtually impossible for the online casinos to figure out who is doing it, and if they could, maybe they might look the other way anyway -- do they want that publicity? -- "COLLUDERS FOUND AND KICKED OFF" -- I don't think so, I wouldn't if I ran it. And let's say they could figure it out, and they made the decision to kick colluders off, then why can't the colluders open accounts in their wife's maiden name, their kids names, etc, and keep doing it?
And David, I do not believe PP is cheating and I do not believe the hackers can get in, but I strongly believe that colluders SHOULD BE playing, especially in split games. In other words, if I were a pro, and I had a good friend, also a pro, and we were both really really good at Stud H/L or O8, we could sit in my den, with two machines, play in mostly the same games, and share info and trap people. This SHOULD BE happening, so I think it very very likely is. Check out the lineups, by the way, at the high stakes, same players a lot of the time.
Now after writing this I feel even more strongly: Please publish more about this so people might know what might be happening to them.
Mark
Question?
Is there a law against cheating on Internet Poker?
I don't think so?
DS forgot to mention Mark Glover as an expert on collusion. I am sure that Mark is an ethical player but he has demonstrated a great and vast knowledge of collusion in the past in his writings.
yes you should write one
Elsewhere (http://www.twoplustwo.com/cgi-bin/inet.pl?read=2315), David wrote that proficient colluders could win two big bets per hour, and no algorithm would be able to catch them. He implied that an expert could catch the colluders, but I don't find this credible. If you didn't rely on some degree of automated screening to identify possible colluders, then you would only investigate complaints brought by players ... and as (I think) Abdul has pointed out, you'd be swamped by inaccurate accusations.
David, there is a reason that the U.S. doesn't publish nuclear secrets on the internet. Sure, it might result in a call from a concerned citizen who finally realizes what those barrels of plutonium in his neighbor's yard are for, but it is more likely that the info will used by terrorists to further their own ends.
Like you said, most colluders really don't have a clue what they are doing. Let's keep it that way.
fyiw, i read somewhere (like cnn.com or something, a reputable source) that the atomic energy commission or nuclear regulatory agency or whatever its called somehow inadvertantly connected some computers to its network that werent supposed to be, and the end result was that there were nuclear secrets available on the internet.
just thought it was funny.
brad
Widespread paranoa of cheating will keep the new players away...
p.s have not read a single response
David,
I hope that you are not going to waste your time writing a treatise on something as inconsequential to the average poker player as collusion. The most anyopne can say about collusion is that for the vast majority of poker playing it does not occur. If it occurs at all it probably is seen at the very high limits. A place where 99% of poker players will never visit. Advanced poker concepts are much more interesting and valuable to your readers. Writing a treatise on a subject that is bound to cause unfounded paranoia and could in fact be detrimental to poker by raising suspicians that have no basis in fact seems to be counterproductive for the good of poker. I know guys like Abdul and Glover willl disagree but tell me, who do you like best?
Vince
it will be bad for poker, but it would make for interesting reading.
i say write it. even though it's publication will lose me money in the long run.
scott
What is the correct amount of money to buy in for in a 15/30 game?
How much money should you have around with you to rebuy with?
I'd take $1,500 and buy in for $500.
How much do you take for 4/8 or 10/20? Just make a ratio.
CV
That's what I was going to do, but I wanted some opinions based on what players who are in these games actually bring.
I usually play 5/10, I've never played higher limit. I know 15/30 is a huge jump, and the only thing that is enticing me to play is that the opposition will likely be the same guys that are in my 5/10 game. The same guys that I am currently chewing up.
My local casino only spreads a 5/10 game and we only have enough guys for one table most of the time. On Thursdays there is a 1-2-5 pot limit game (which I don't play in). On the next Thursday, to celebrate the opening of the casino, there is going to be a no-limit holdem game with a $1000 buy-in. They think that there will be enough people to fill a 15-30 game as well. This is what I am going to play in, I think. I don't know if I have the balls to jump up so much. If the jump affects me psychologically I don't think it will be worth it. But if the game conditions are right I want to be able to play in it.
I do not think the ratio holds. I buy in for 500 and bring 1000. 500/1500 is probably better. The difference between 5/10 and 15/30 is night vs day
I agree that 500/1500 is about right. If you are worried about the first attempt at this limit, it would be ok to bring only 1000 but over the long run you will need more to stay in action on some poorly running day.
BTW which city is this new casino in?
D.
It's one year old actually, and it's in Grande Prairie, Alberta, Canada.
If you want to play in a juicy pot limit game, it's the place (at least that is my perception).
I've had a running dialect with a local floorman for awhile. I play almost exclusively small games ($6-12 and below) and for the most part very loose/very passive $3-6 Omaha w/full kill. He says he prefers to play at clubs that only have one large blind and no small blind...that it costs him $1 less/round. I've felt, for the longest time, that all the bad players that automatically throw in the extra $2 to call in the small blind "because I've already got money invested" (love that logic!) more than make up for the extra dollar it costs me.
Discuss.
Now, for those of you that see it my way, my theorem:
One needs a better starting hand to call $2 in the small blind than to call $3 on the button.
Marc - It costs you an “extra dollar” once per round.
Thus if you scoop more than one hand per round (when it is not your small blind), or if you split the pot more than two hands per round (also when it is not your small blind), or if some combination of scoops and splits averages one whole win per round (again when it is not your small blind), then you show a net gain.
I don’t think a tight player averages one whole win per round. Too bad, because I like your theorem.
:-)
Buzz
Marc,
I agree concerning your preference for two blinds.
Regarding your last statement, I think it depends on how much the hand needs position. In both cases, you will know the number of opponents and the pot odds. So lets say you have a marginal hand in either position.
Marginal hands like baby pairs play almost as well acting first post flop as they do acting last. But Ax suited plays much better in back as do most drawing hands such as 87 suited.
That being said, I think your statement is a good rule of thumb.
Regards,
Rick
Just finished "Inside the Poker Mind" and wanted to add my .02.
I'm just a novice but it seems to me that this is a book written by a guy who can write. It is clear, concise, organized and covers aspects of the game at a practical level that is not only important to good play but easy to understand. I found it to be of great value in my continuing education.
Would suggest placing this book next to HPFAP, TOP, on yor bookshelf.
Lou
What exactly did you get from the book? You don't say how it helped your poker progress...
I'm interested in expanding my library a bit, so have an eye on this one.
Graham
Fair question, Graham ... I can not even count the number of posts here that start out, "That is covered by Chapter X of TOP" or something like that.
I e-mailed John a long time ago to tell him I loved the book. I'll make that public now as well.
Graham, the best specific new ideas that I got from John's book were in the section, "Easing the Transition to the Middle Limits." This is where I am going to be in the near future myself. I don't remember seeing a discussion anywhere before this book that talks about the changes you need to make in your game and in your outlook, as part of this transition.
My second choice for new material is his discussions throughout the book about psychology. John is a PhD clinical psychologist, and so he gives us a truly different expert viewpoint from our other heroes, who are either mathematicians or pro poker players or both.
Dick
Agreed. This book in fantastic. I think his book very clearly illustrates the "next levels" of poker play. I think it is a great book for anyone who already has the framework in place of a good, solid game.
In addition to that, it is clearly written. In fact, it is written very well, and I could not put it down. To tell you the truth, I cannot wait to re-read it, to absorb it a little bit more.
Feeny's book really clicked with me, and I believe that in the future, I will be able to look back and see that it represents a turning point in my poker "career." Get it - You will be so happy you did.
Two of my favorite sections, at least after the first read through, were: 1. Where he discusses a particular action in a hand from an average players perspective and from an advanced players perspective - you truly are inside the poker mind on this one. and 2. Where he discusses how he learned the game. I felt this historical perspective show us more novice players that anyone who is committed to the game can learn it, learn it well, and succeed. It offers a clear perspective to anyone who says "I want to play like that person."
John, thank you again for writing this book. I truly enjoyed it.
Thanks, Tim
Rather than doing all or nothing, I think it might be better to get our feet a little wet and see how it goes. This might be the first two of 50 questions or I might stop here.
10-20 Holdem. Ten handed. Average game. Two players fold. You have Ace clubs Queen diamonds. Your partner is in the small blind with the ten of spades and the five of spades. Call, raise or fold? (And if you raise, should he call?)
Same situation except this time your partner has the QJ of spades?
I am going to guess.
1) You can't possibly fold. Your partners hand is completely unrelated to yours and worse. I think calling before the flop is best. He can put in a flop bet and you raise and the pot won't be so big, kind of like the S&M argument for just limping with AQ in loose games. Also he might get in cheap and flop some big hand.
2) A raise might be better now as he can afford to call the raise and you can still make the play on the flop. However I am going to guess that, do to the lack of liveness for your hand, you can just throw it away.
D.
#1:
By raising you are getting more money in with a good hand and may win the big blind. Both your hands are live, although the Ts 5s is a trouble hand. However, by raising you are depriving your partner of the opportunity to see a cheap flop, and may reduce his odds to the extent that even the value of post-flop collusion may not be worth the preflop price he is paying. In addition if you are up against a much better hand and are reraised you have just been isolated and your partner cannot continue. There is little to gain here by preflop raising , especially since you may drive out those hands you would like to have call such as AJ. It would appear better to let your partner take a cheap flop, and then you can combine forces either to clear the field with a probably good but vulnerable flop, or to trap and extract extra value from opponents if one of you should get lucky and hit something big.
#2. My guess here is that your partner would not even call the $5 unless he were in a very multiway pot, since his Q is a detriment except for straights and flushes. In addition you should not raise and may well even be better off folding your AQ--this could be determined by running simulations. My guess is that this is a fold for the AQ since AQ upfront is a raisable but not a great holding even when totally live.
If I am right on these things let me state that I have never tried this and do not intend to, but that the above analysis does pretty much make sense to me from a "value" and "card sense" perspective at a first glance. It could probably be improved upon by running simulations and charting the results.
I would just call in both situations.
In the first case I want "partner" to see the flop with his live cards and flush draw. I could be in a position to raise people out if he flopped a ten.
In the second case I don't like the fact that my Queen is duplicated but partner can still flop a Jack or nice draw. So I would just call and see what develops letting him in cheap. If it gets raised both of our hands are cheapened and we can escape for one bet.
You should call in the first situation since you want to give your partner proper odds to call in the SB with 5s,Ts and you are not giving up much by making this play. It also looks correct.
When your partner has Js,Qs you should now raise since it is correct for your partner to play in a raised pot and you want to narrow down the field so that you have a great opportunity to whiplash a player when you happen to both flop a Queen.
In both situations you would like to keep your partner in the pot early since I suspect most money from collution comes from whiplashing and driving out players by creative betting and raising.
CV
I can't imagine you should raise in the second scenario. You have less chance to flop a Queen, plus how are you going to really whiplash someone if you do flop it? What hand would he call a whiplash with? What if he has you both beat? Your best hope here is to catch someone with KQ or QJ since they just >i>might call a whiplash. But if the victim holds a Q the chances of flopping one become really remote.
Here is how I look at the second problem.
First you want to play Pair Poker with both hands so raising to limit the field is OK. The only terrible Flop would be King High + Garbage otherwise there is Ace and Second best Kicker, Queen Best kicker, Queen Third best kicker, and Jack with Third best kicker. Of course there are lots of redraws to better hands.
If total garbage does flop the SB can bet and the AQ can raise to knock out any player behind them. Unless the opponent has a High PP or good draw he is gonna fold.
The you don't need to raise and reraise to whiplash in my thoughts of the term. Just setting the odd man in the middle will do the job with a bet, call, raise, call, call. This could be done on a least two streets.
I think "G. Ed" or "thecat" made an interesting comment of the SB being able to reraise and knock out the BB if no one else had called.
And no I do not Collude, I never have and never will. I do use position a lot to make colluding like plays. If I have a big hand and I think I can trap people in the middle when a second best hand bets, I'll go for it. I also like to drive people into second best hands if that person is aggressive enough to raise.
CV
I think Chris' analysis is a good example of how easily many poor colluders/poor players lose money (especially in his first post addressing Question #2).
Play "Pair Poker" by raising this hand? Just how would that be playing Pair Poker? Invest lots of money to try to win a Blind? Again, what if you are beat or get beat?
If I were playing against two opponents who were colluding by regularly raising and reraising with duplicated high cards, I would think that they were an asset to my bottom line. I would especially like them trying to whipsaw me when I held a powerhouse. I would let them raise me out of nothing pots, knowing that they are laying too much and that their gains from me will be small and their losses big.
Look M, I don't mind you disagreeing with me, but if you don't respect my thoughts how can we have a conversation on the subject?
If I was colluding in with a partner and had a man in the middle we would have to be 67% sure one of us was going to win the pot since we are basicly laying 2 to 1 on a Whipsaw play. So the time to jam would be when we were quite sure our opponent was on the Draw on 4th or maybe had a total Fish in the hand who would be playing the Second pair ect...
Just my thoughts,
CV
Chris, I apologize for the tone of my remarks. It's not that I don't respect your thoughts, just that it struck me as strongly unlikely to work as desired and as sometimes very costly as well. I could be wrong too.
"You should call in the first situation since you want to give your partner proper odds to call in the SB with 5s,Ts"
I don't think this is correct. When playing with a partner, the bankroll should be thought of as common. Betting to give your partner proper odds is like putting one extra bet yourself in. The only consideration should be whether to induce an extra bet from another opponent later on, whom you think you have beat.
(We do assume that the partner in the SB has an open-line communication with you and you decide jointly on the play of your two hands, rather than the partner deciding how to play his hand on the basis of pot odds, or some other "standard" consideration.)
This is true; you could not give your partner proper money odds by using your joint bankroll.
However, allowing your partner to get in cheap may pay dividends after the flop.
1) AQo T5s - Play the hand as normal. Call. This two hand combination and the players poor position does not offer any significant advantage.
2) AQo QJs - Fold. AQo is one of the danger hands and the danger has just escalated. This is a very profitable fold, but one that would set off lots of red flags.
Question 2 is a GREAT example of a profitable collusion play that would have to be avoided when being detected is a problem.
And this is just the first question!
I think there is another consideration here, that you didn't bring up in the post. Am I supposed to play the hand optimally, or so that I'm not suspected of colluding?
I'll operate on the basis that I don't want to raise any *real* red flags.
In the first case, I feel the best way to play is to raise A-Q, just as in the case of a single player, the hand plays best with few opponents. The 10-5 of spades is sufficiently different from the A-Q that it warrants a call because it will have betting and raising equity after the flop enough times when the A-Q misses the flop to be valuable.
With the Q-J, the two hands work well together, like a bastardized omaha hand. The additional dead queen, hampers the pre-flop strength of both hands enough so that I would be tempted to limp with the A-Q as to not cost myself too much in case the flop is bad for both hands. If I were to raise, I would 3 bet with the Q-J if it helped isolate the hand or win the big blind.
In case #2, just how do "the two hands work well together, like a bastardized Omaha hand"?
The hand is bastardized because, of course, you are not playing omaha. But, what I'm trying to say is that there are similarities between a good omaha hand with coordinated cards, and a hand that will work well in collusion. A high flop that helps both hands will give a "psudo wrap" giving you many cards that will complete a strong hand with either the Q-J or the A-Q and both hands will apparently have a reason to be contesting the pot.
I'll take the internet poker tack.
If I were going to try to write software to detect collusion (e.g. on the internet), I would write routines that analyzed how players played their starting hands and looked for cases where they deviated. Then I would ask if the deviation was related to a hand or play deviation of another player. If I found several instances, those players would go under a (human) microscope.
I would also look at the starting cards in the context of the board and see if the play made sense (did all the players who were raising "have something"). Then I would ask if the deviation was related to some particular other player(s) "having something". When I found some instances those players would again go under a (human) microscope.
But in the middle of the game, things get so complicated that I'm not sure what I would look for. So as a colluder, I would try to make most of my "moves" on the flop and turn.
From the perspective of trying to avoid being under that microscope:
1. Raise, your partner will drop. Use the information about his hand when trying to determine what you are up against post-flop.
2. Raise, because your partner's cards are enough like your own that whipsawing becomes less detectable and he can freely call the raise because his cards are "good enough". Both of your hands are weakened, but your collusion potential is strengthened.
David
Note that I am writing this from the online perspective; much would change if hole cards and win rates could not be monitored.
Given that not being detected is of primary importance and that collusion detecting software and/or an observer is examining the play, whipsawing with a nothing hand is unacceptable due to the danger of detection.
AQ can probably never be folded at this stage, even if your partner should have AA or AQ. Your history will not show you to be such a tight player.
Raising presents the problem of causing your partner to either forfeit team money to the pot before the flop or to put even more team money at risk with a hand that has next to no actual value unless it hits the flop pretty hard. Keeping in mind that the action behind you is crucial to the small blind's decision, I suggest that the correct play for both scenarios would be:
IF your raises have been getting a lot of respect, raise, SB folds (giving BB 3.5 to 1 instead of 5 to 1), hoping to either play the BB heads up without the benefit of collusion or to win it outright.
ELSE call, hoping to get a couple more callers behind you, SB calls, and see how things develop on the flop.
This thought process leads me to suspect that correct partner play may involve very little pre flop raising. Although two players in collusion have twice the chance to flop a good hand, they are also paying twice as much to do so. Add in the "horse race" concept and the amount of luck involved on the flop, and it seems to me right now that most of the benefit of non blatant collusion is probably going to occur after the flop when the partners hold complementary, but not exclusive, hands/draws. It also seems necessary that they both have reasonable starting hands because a high win rate combined with a very large # of hands played would raise the red flag for the observer.
Let me add that having done very little thinking about this, I have correspondingly little confidence in its correctness. That is why I hope you continue with the project. I see this stuff, I don't "think" they're hurting me, but I am not sure. This one small example quickly became so complex that the guidance of a true expert would ... help.
Not knowing much about collusion, but here goes...
Q1: I would raise because you only have to worry about one player between you and the small blind, that is the big blind. If I thought that the big blind often (or even sometimes) folded for a raise, I would raise the AQ. I suspect that having two colluders next to each other is very valuable, so the raise is worth it. Then on the flop, the SB can bet and AQ can raise. The only flop that's trouble is the K high one mentioned in another post. I think that seeing a lot of flops is mandatory in colluding strategy.
Q2: I would raise/fold the AQ or QJ based on the game conditions. If the game was tight I would probably be raising/reraising with a lot of hands worse than these two. If the game was loose, I would probably fold both (under optimal conditions) or just call if I was worried about being detected.
I don't know anything about these topics, but these arguments make sense to me. I think that knowing solid poker strategy with collusion could be devestating. For example, me who is almost oblivious to game conditions and expert strategy would be a decent colluder. S&M could destroy. Why, because stuff that we take advantage of playing straight can really be exploited. I am talking about player tendencies and game conditions. Colluding with optimal play has to be ATM-like
This is wrong, what the hell are you thinking?
To the people that say you should raise I have a question. Are you raising so that you can win one big blind? Why not just call and try to win a big pot when you OR your partner flop something good?
This 2-part question raises some interesting theoretical points and shows why many would-be colluders aren't good enough to win.
This thread reinforces my previously expressed discomfort with this topic; in fact, I find your post disturbing. The phrasing of your questions suggests a tacit acceptance of collusion (though I do not think this was your intention).
Discussion of collusion from the perspective of how honest players can detect cheaters would be less dangerous, even though it might cover similar theoretical ground.
Acceptance is not the same thing as endorsement. If one thinks that there are colluders out there, then one should accept that it is happening, and learn what to do. Denying that it is happening when it really is will only cost you money.
So we can discuss this topic without endorsing it.
Acceptance is also not the same as acknowledgement. We can acknowledge the existence of cheating while making clear it is not acceptable. This discussion of how to most effectively collude with your partner implies that it is acceptable IMO.
Question #1. The AQo in this instance should be played in a straight forward manner. That is, it should be played as if there were no collusion planned for this hand - raise. If there are no callers once the action gets to the SB, the 10-5 must now reraise in order to knock the BB out of the pot. Regardless of the flop, the 10-5 must now bet and AQ makes an automatic fold regardless. Question #2. Same thing.
The more people who answer these questions erroneously, the more it should be apparent that most would-be or actual colluders would also be attempting to employ unprofitable strategies. This supports the view that there is little to fear from most colluders.
Also striking are the parallels to an understanding of poker itself; hand values, desired action, and tactics such as when to knock people out and when to trap. I think the two questions David Sklansky posed are highly instructive for these reasons as well.
One thing is clear: Everyone is coming up with different answers and that means most people are wrong. The fact that this is so means that most colluders would also very likely be wrong in their approaches; it is doubtful that most colluders have a better understanding of the game than most people on this forum. However, we have not yet heard from some of the best on this forum regarding these questions, so the answers given so far may not be representative of most people on this forum.
Based on the answers I have seen so far, I wouldn't mind if most of the people who have supplied answers tried colluding against me--I think they would be costing themselves money by employing poor strategy. This is not to say that my answers are 100% correct either (we will leave complete explanation to DS of course), but that there are some people out there who have little idea of the underlying basis for certain actions in poker. That's OK because we are all here to share ideas and to learn. It does really show that many people don't approach these questions from the proper perspective, and strengthens the argument that we have little to fear from many colluders unless they are also very good players.
Since most players are not very good players, and even fewer players are colluders, the percentage of players who are both very good players and colluders is very small. A poor player who is also a colluder is still a poor player, and is likely to be a poor colluder also (unless David provides him with an easy-to-use blueprint, that is).
I say to you what I said above: how much better do you think you would do if you knew the value and location of two extra cards on EVERY hand? Forget about whipsawing or helping out your partner. Just look at the situation from the perspective of having added information every hand that others don't have. What do you think this would be worth to you?
I haven't read all the responses and it seems to me one needs to do some calculations as opposed to giving general principles and basing answers on that.
For M's 8 03 response, what you are saying is very dangerous. Bc most can't answer this Q (or at least most don't agree), doesn't mean you wouldn't mind being colluded against. Youd get killed! I suspect if you had a 3 handed game youd get killed. It would b e very easy to squeeze you out of pots. And if there were more colluders it would get even worse.
For Cliff Note 8:43 response: knowing this would be HUGE! It would be joke.
First of all I chose questions that are not examples of major profit makers for colluders. I still am uncertain where I want to go with this. But I did choose two questions where the fact that you are colluding ought to change your play. Under normal circumstances the AQ should raise, the T5s should fold that raise and the QJs should call it. We will get to the answer shortly. First a few points 1. If two cards are shown that don't duplicate yours, that knocks up your chances of pairing by a small but not insignificant amount. 2. If you and your partner both play a non paired hand, the difference between duplicating one card and not, is the difference between having 12 cards to hit and 8 cards. One way, somebody flops a pair 59%, the other is 43%. 3. If you duplicate a card with a real opponent, his taking your out away is counterbalanced when you have him dominated and thus figure to win many bets if you both hit. This goes away if the dominated hand is held by your partner. 4.Because of opportunities to take advantage of your partnership after the flop, you should tend to want both partners to play a hand and thus hands that would be borderline folds no longer should be. On the other hand, borderline before the flop raises should not be made if it might drive out a partner or cost him more EV to stay in than the raise gained. When you have AQ in third position, after two players have folded your hand is pretty good. Knowing your partner has T5s makes that hand even better. Normally raising shows a profit. Here it would show an even larger profit. The problem is that a raise squeezes your partner who would prefer not to be raised. BUT: (a)The T5s has gone up in value after seeing the AQ, (b)The T5s has gone up in value because if it stays in it will be able to play with a partner after the flop, and (c) The ace queen goes up even more in value if it has a partner to play with after the flop. The answer to Question #1 is therefore normally that the AQ should raise and the T5s should call. In the case of question #2, your AQ has turned to crap. If you somehow knew a real opponent had QJs in the small blind that would make up for your lesser wins but being that it is your partner your hand totally sucks. To raise would be insane. Not only from your standpoint but also because your partner wants to see a cheap flop. Mathematically it may be right to fold that AQ. But there are three reasons not to: (a) you may be being watched, (b) your lousy hand goes up in value because you may be able to collude further later on, and (c) by limping you may dissuade a raise behind you which helps your partner. Thus the answer to question #2 is generally to call with both hands.
For the record, I find these type of questions fascinating. Aside from any ethical aspects, they are interesting puzzles to solve and add another dimension to the subject of poker.
Those Bridge players think they can send signals. Hah! They have a lot to learn from rounders.
Mark, While I respect many of your views on a myriad of topics on these forums, I believe in this post you have employed faulty logic in arriving at your conclusion. Let's take your paragraphs one by one:
You wrote: "The more people who answer these questions erroneously, the more it should be apparent that most would-be or actual colluders would also be attempting to employ unprofitable strategies. This supports the view that there is little to fear from most colluders."
The unstated assumpion here is that the posts made in response to David's original thread are representative of the current "colluding population." Clearly this is not the case...I would in fact be very surprised if anyone who posted in response to the original post has ever colluded in their poker career, much less have given very much thought to the tactics and overall strategy would be most profitable. Just because the overwhelming number of posts strike you as examples of "inept collusion" does not mean that your garden-variety colluding team is harmless. In effect, the sample generated on this forum, and by which you make your conclusion, is not likely to be representative of the "colluding population," thus your argument suffers from the fallacy of relevance of "false authority."
Next you wrote:
"Also striking are the parallels to an understanding of poker itself; hand values, desired action, and tactics such as when to knock people out and when to trap. I think the two questions David Sklansky posed are highly instructive for these reasons as well. "
i agree with this paragraph in principle, however, I think the important point that many of those who posted are unlikely to be regular colluders makes any conclusion you draw from this proposition shaky.
Next: "One thing is clear: Everyone is coming up with different answers and that means most people are wrong. The fact that this is so means that most colluders would also very likely be wrong in their approaches; it is doubtful that most colluders have a better understanding of the game than most people on this forum. However, we have not yet heard from some of the best on this forum regarding these questions, so the answers given so far may not be representative of most people on this forum."
Here you acknowledge that those who had responded to the post are likely not to be representative of "most people on this forum," yet, again you miss the critical point that unless most who responded to David's post are habitual colluders, it is illogical to conclude anything about colluders in general based on the posts found in this thread. On a side note, in your last sentence, I find another illogical statement: "However, we have not yet heard from some of the best on this forum regarding these questions, so the answers given so far may not be representative of most people on this forum." Does this mean that "most people on this forum" are also "some of the best?" This seems counterintuitive, since best inherently means above average, and thus anything but "most." Just a small point.
Further on: "Based on the answers I have seen so far, I wouldn't mind if most of the people who have supplied answers tried colluding against me--I think they would be costing themselves money by employing poor strategy. This is not to say that my answers are 100% correct either (we will leave complete explanation to DS of course), but that there are some people out there who have little idea of the underlying basis for certain actions in poker. That's OK because we are all here to share ideas and to learn. It does really show that many people don't approach these questions from the proper perspective, and strengthens the argument that we have little to fear from many colluders unless they are also very good players.
I would agree with most of this paragraph, with the exception of the assumption that David is capable of providing the "complete explanation," based solely on his position of authority. An argument is judged primarily by one factor: its adherence to the laws of logic. While authority can and often does become a reason to accept someone's opinions or judgements in cases where the concpets are subjective or inherently difficult to prove or disprove (a psychologist's testimony in court for example), in general it is much safer to rely on logic to assess the validity of an argument. There seems to be a running bias on these forums to blindly accept David and Mason's statements as articles of faith, without deconstructing the reasoning behind their statements. Indeed I think we do them a disservice by NOT actively dissecting their advice, precisely BECAUSE so much weight is placed on what they write in the forums and in their books. I am often extremely impressed by David and Mason's work, and how well thought out their arguments can be, but I try not to let this bias prevent me from rationally analyzing each new thing I read, and I think many others would profit from this approach, since it often leads to much deeper understanding of the concepts involved.
On to the last paragraph: "Since most players are not very good players, and even fewer players are colluders, the percentage of players who are both very good players and colluders is very small. A poor player who is also a colluder is still a poor player, and is likely to be a poor colluder also (unless David provides him with an easy-to-use blueprint, that is)."
Most players are not "very good players." Clearly this is true, how can it be anything but true if "very good" is defined as "well above-average" (traces of binomial distribution here). Compare this statement with your earlier on above. I think pointing this fact out is a good idea, and you use this proposition to make your next conclusion, that a poor player that is also a poor colluder is still a poor player, and likely a poor colluder. However I don't think this tells us anything about whether the posters on this forum are represntative of colluders in general, and again I think it is faulty logic to base the conclusion that collusion is not an important issue (presumably on Internet poker) on the posting of those few that chose to respond to David's original post. I would even venture to state that any "professional colluder" reading this thread would be unlikely to post ANYTHING.
Let me put this dissection of your post in perspective, Mark. The fact is, I tend to agree with your general opinion that collusion is probably not a very significant problem, and that most would-be colluders are sufficiently poor players that any attempts at collusion would likely backfire.
Nevertheless, I chose to lay out my dissection of your argument, along with its presumptions and propositions, and ultimately its conclusions, to demonstrate what I think many people on this forum fail to do; namely, to think logically and critically about the arguments of others. Now this critical thinking is not to promote discord on the forum, but to promote rigid thinking and to fight what David aptly terms "fuzzy thinking." I chose your post because I often find much of what you write here to be very thoughtful, and thought you strayed a bit from the path of logic here. I aslo chose you since I have met you in person, and seem the type that would not take this post personally, but would recognize it for what it is: an attempt to promote thoughtful and structured thinking on the forum.
P.S. On your next order from Amazon, be sure to include "With Good Reason" by S. Morris Engel. This text is excellent reading on logic and informal fallacies. Many on this forum would do well to read it as well. I recommend it to you because I am familiar with your varied interest in philosophy and logic.
Maven,
While you would be right if my statements were absolutes, I don't think the ones you are questioning are. None of my statements are attempts to draw any definitive conclusions, only likelihoods. If I were trying to draw hard and fast conclusions my logic would be seriously flawed. However, I am only drawing likelihoods. For instance, while the sample size of posts is small and clearly not necessarily representative of either the people on this forum or of colluders in general, it would be illogical to assume that it is more likely that there would be no correlation at all than that there would be some correlation, however small. While it is illogical to conclude anything about colluders based on what others have posted in this thread, it is not illogical to assume that colluders, as poker players, share many of the same thought processes as non-colluding poker players in analyzing a hand or poker situation. It is more likely that both groups do share some of the same tendencies towards similar analyses of poker situations than that they do not. Note that I do not say "professional colluders." If they are professional they had better know what they are doing or they won't be professional very long. My guess is that most colluders are trying it and failing at it just as they have failed at poker.
The greater the ratio of erroneous versus correct answers that are posted, the more the likelihood of it being representative of colluders increases (even if that likelihood is so small as to be virtually negligible).
Likewise when I say "the more it should be apparent", I am not saying that it actually is of yet apparent as a proven fact, only that it becomes more apparent than it was. If it was only very remotely likely, it is still true that as the ratio of erroneous answers increases, that likelihood does move however slightly in the direction I have specified.
I agree that ALL of the tentative conclusions I drew are shaky, and I realized this as I wrote them; I wrote them, or tried to write them, in such a way that allowed for drawing tentative conclusions based on likelihoods, however slim, without stating them as facts.
I don't think I ever said that collusion is not an important issue, even in my other posts, only that I felt it was relatively rare and could be overcome with skill and good game selection. I also somewhere stated something to the effect that I guessed most colluders really aren't good enough as either players or colluders to be much of a threat. This may change as Internet Poker continues on its merry way, and collusion may possibly become a much more serious problem. It could even become what eventually kills Internet Poker, though if that occurs it won't be anytime very soon.
I too believe in analyzing everything and not just accepting things on "authority." When I referred to David providing a "complete explanation", I did not imply that he could not be in error or that we should not analyze it on our own as well. However, I do think the chances of most of us coming up with either as complete or as accurate an analysis of something like this as David could are slim.
When I said "this supports the view that there is little to fear from most colluders", it does indeed support the view. What is open to question is how much support does it lend to the view.
Finally I did not say that most collusion is harmless. It is not harmless, but I think most collusion can be overcome by skill, or avoided by game selection. If colluders play poorly enough, or attempt collusion with improper strategy, the better player will generally beat them anyway. It is my opinion that colluders of this type are the most common variety, far more common, I would guess, than professional colluders. However, professional colluders probably last longer at their chosen endeavor.
I think structured thinking, logic and analysis are extremely important and I do not take your critique personally. I believe it is good to deconsruct arguments and look as deeply as possible at anything one cares to analyze.
I do think that if one looks at exactly what I wrote, it can be seen that my logic was not flawed when the English is taken literally. Instead of actually drawing conclusions, I am merely bolstering certain arguments. I admit that how much these arguments have been bolstered is far from defined.
*
Colluders must balance the EV gain of collusion plays with the risk of their cheating being detected. For this reason, I believe cautious colluders would forego most preflop collusion plays and focus on more profitable post-flop collusion. Although post-flop collusion opportunities would be relatively infrequent (thereby helping to avoid suspicion), they would usually be much more profitable.
Student,
I agree. The colluders would love to collude postflop at O8, especially when they can catch someone in the middle. Even if one of the colluders gets qtr'd with the non-colluder, the colluders win 3/4's and they've bet 2/3s: They can raise and raise. And no one will notice. And when one of the colluders can scoop...hm, a few of those a day are big money in the bank.
But read on about pre-flop, my message about sims. I think serious study of collusion could win a fortune online.
Mark
David,
You show great ingenuity with these questions. I ran sims on both hands, these showed me some interesting results, these results agree completely with you on #1, but I am not sure about #2.
#1: Normal sim: AQo early raiser avgs about 1.1 small bets profit per hand, but then SB avgs about .5 loss; this is with AQ raising, SB non-partner folding. Most of the profit comes from taking the big blind's $10....I then tried lots of combinations of calling with AQ, both raising, etc, but none of these did better than the usual AQ raising, and Txs folding. By Txs knowing more and staying in to limpers, and AQo knowing more, I believe that this set of hands does much better than it does with 'normal' play. One difference is that Txs always stays (except to re- raisers), but his loss is his partner's gain generally. This makes a lot of sense.
#2: Normal sim: AQo, with QJs in SB. They average together winning, but half (or slighty less) as much as in sim #1. The AQ is weakened a lot, and the QJs loses (but not as much as Txs), at least to the average lineup. And the QJs plays for the 1 1/2 bet.
I found two interesting things in the sims:
1. Unless someone else had a strong strong hand, a hand with which they would re-raise: AA, KK, AKs or AKo, or QQ (yes it happens), or JJ, they are a giant dog! (OK, they almost break even with KJ and KT too). What about this strategy: AQo raises. If anyone else re-raises, the QJs folds, the AQo calls, and QUICKLY folds to anything on the flop which isn't a great match. This should be profitable, and hides the collusion. If you didn't care about collusion, they could both fold, but this would look bad. I do not think that anyone could detect this collusion if AQo raised, QJs called limpers or folded to a reraise, and then if AQo folded to a bad (or non-good) board bet.
SO: If you eliminate the AA, KK, AK, QQ, JJ from the sims, the AQo/QJs combo takes all. If they fold quickly to re-raisers who will have such hands, and they are skilled players, they clean up here.
2. If I set it up for both AQo and QJs to call, they make less than the AQo raising (and sharing wins with QJs). It is not more profitable to call, even with the dead Q. Perhaps my sim setup or reasoning is flawed.
David, this example, on which I spent only a few (under 30) minutes, scares me to death. I wish the online poker sites no harm. But if I can start to figure out what to do here (perhaps flawed, etc, but only 30 minutes and I am beginning to understand what CAN be done by colluders): What could pro's who are smart smart smart (yes, smarter than I am) and know simulations better than I do, what can they do?
And what about AQo, coupled with KJs? Or other interesting combos? If someone spent real time studying a few dozen combos to collude with, worked on this using TTHE sims, got it down well, they could kill any game I think. Also, what about split games? Isn't that worse?
Mark
You're shinnying up the wrong tree and the poker gods are mighty upset.
Warped cards are still out there. I payed in an Iowa riverboat casino yesterday (7-01-00). They used blue/red Kem cards. Most jacks and queens had very noticeable warpage; the aces and kings were sometimes warped (to a lesser degree), sometimes flat. Occasionally other cards (some 2s and 3s) were warped so my reads (ie warped=high card) weren't 100% reliable. Nobody said anything; I'm not sure if no one noticed (unlikely) or if they just tried to do their best to use the information. Management seemed unconcerned.
It is correct that there are still some warped cards out there, and this includes the red/blue decks. What happens is that some cards that appear perfect when taken out of the wrapping will begin to warp after a couple of hours of being exposed to the air even if they are not used.
In Las Vegas, the two major cardrooms, The Mirage and The Bellagio -- where I have spoken to management -- are both very aware of the problem and are removing bad decks as they find them.
As stated before, this is a manufacturing problem, and the manufacturer Kem Cards is well aware of it and is suppose to be working on a fix.
The Commerce has been using another brand of cards which doesn't seem to have the warping problem at all. I forgot to ask what it was, but will try to remember to ask the next time I'm there (probably this Fri.).
(n/t)
Jim and all,
Hollywood Park Uses brown and green Kems for top section and Red and Blue for limits below 6/12. I haven't noticed the problem yet but I'll stay on the lookout also.
Regards,
Rick
In my casino they use Bee cards for all house games, adn the Kem cards in the poker room. The Bee cards seem much better in quality. Why don't they use these in the poker rooms too?
Because they are made of paper and not plastic. Thus, they can't take the type of abuse they are subject to in a poker game.
Greetings,
I was playing in a 10/20 game w/ a half kill. I had AQs in early postion and open for a raise for 20. I forgot it was a kill pot, and then the dealer asks me do i want to raise... I toss in another 10 and the table almost freaks out. ANd say it is not a raise bc it is less than 1/2 and vehemently argue that it is not a raise... (I didn't say raise but almost never do, but I think it was clear what my intention was).
As it turned out the first floor man said it was a raise, the table screamed for another man who said it was not. I asked to speak to his supervisor and he said that he was the final authority. I thought it was unfair, and even thought considered leaving the table. (If everyone was so hostile, is this the game I should playing in? I want happy and laughing gamblers at my talbe, not a bunch of angry hotheads who get bent out of shape over technicalities for most don't matter).
I should note all folded to the blind. I asked the table why are they arguing so vehemently if they weren't going to play for 1 bet.
Is this the correct ruling?
As a side Q: would you stay a such a table? The table was somewhat aggressive but it was clear not many knew what they were doing w/their excessive calling, and weak starting hand selection.
All comments appreciated.
This issue has come up at Foxwoods on occasion. Intent is not the issue here; calling a string raise was quite acceptable. The first floorman either didn't understand the situation or was just plain wrong (perhaps equally likely). If they playing lots of bad hands and your goal was to make money you would probably have stayed even with the hostility. If your goal was to have a relaxing or enjoyable time then I would suggest changing tables. Your own personal preference.
Well I didn't make a stink bc it would only make the situation worse. BUt i disagree, rules are there for reasons. If this was a "pure" 15/30 game then i could see the pb, but here I think my intent was clear. The reason for this rule is to stop the raiser from getting information. And it seems the table information and not me...
The first floorman did understand the situation ... but the table insisted on getting another opinion. There wasn't any other 10/20 games, the 6/12 game i left was good but i thought i would make mre money at the 10/20, the 15/30 wasn't, and 20/40 is too high for me...
Intent cannot be allowed to be the issue or we would have people taking all kinds of shots. That's why the rules must be clear and enforced clearly. If someone really wanted to take a shot, and intent was allowed to be the determining factor, all someone would have to do would be make an unethical move to gain information and convince the dealer/players/floor that it was unintentional. A person like yourself who really did not intend to shoot an angle and who was unable to convince others of this would be ruled against.
To avoid the inequalities in such situations, in poker the rules must be uniformly enforced. Allowing the floor to make judgments as to a player's intent is not in the interests of fairness to all in poker. Who really knows the player's intent? rules which are unambiguous are fairer to all.
Rules in poker are not like laws in court. The fairest way to ensure poker fairness is to have good rules and enforce them uniformly. Leaving much room for interpretation in poker rules is a sure way to invite abuses and brew conflicts.
Finally, consider this. You apparently weren't aware that it was a kill pot. Whose responsibility is this? In poker if you snooze, you lose.
"Unusual circumstances can, on rare occasionj, dictate that the technical interpretation if the rules be ignored in the interest of fairness." Supervisors are expected to consider the best interest of the game and fairness as the top priority in the decision-making process, but should only deviate from the technical interpretation when fairness would obviously be lost should this interpretation be used."
This is a quote from our rule book (Stratosphere Tower in Las Vegas). WIth this in mind I would rule that placing $20 in the pot constituted a raise (therefor the player does not have the option of withdrawing a chip and calling, he must complete the raise)
One of the problems with poker is there are certain players who make the game unhospitable to new players by asking for a literal interpretation of the rules. One of the ways supervisors are selected (or should be) is they they are knowledgable enough of the game so they can determine if it is an angle play. The best way to prevent angle players is to eject the angle shooter from the card room. As always all comments are welcome.
Randy Refeld
While in principle I agree that in the interest of fairness at rare times less literal interpretations of certain rules could be applied, I find it hard accept having a rule about string bets that applies except in kill pots, unless it always is so. Or a rule that only out-of-town players can get away with breaking. Or, more to the point in this case, a rule that can be broken because Joe just wasn't paying attention and he didn't know it was a kill pot.
You say you would rule it a raise, always. Yet he only put 4 chips in instead of 3, clearly less than 1/2 the bet more. What if Joe told you he only meant to put out 3 red chips, that the fourth one was an accident, that he only wanted to call? Would you still make him raise? If so, you are saying that you would enforce the string raise rule differently in kill pots (or based on what the player told you). Yet Joe has gained information by the other players' responses. Rules on string bets should be cut and dried one way or the other, period. It is too easy otherwise for a player to take advantage of information gained even if that was not his original intent. For instance, if a player throws out enough red chips to constitute a full raise, then when the dealer says "raise", the player claims he didn't mean to raise, he is probably telling the truth. I've seen it happen, and I'm sure you have too. But that doesn't mean he should get to take his raise back. Certain things are just part of the player's responsibility, and putting in the right amount of chips is one of them. That's poker. In poker, your mistakes usually cost you. That's part of the game, and that's the way it should be. It isn't too much to ask that players bear responsibility for putting in the amount appropriate to their intended action.
Ambiguous interpretations of string raises leaves the area wide open to abuse. It's much simpler and fairer just to follow one rule on this. Allowing the floor to attempt to discern a player's "intent" on this is questionable at best, and a waste of time too. If a player makes a mistake like this the penalty isn't even too severe, just a bet or maybe two , usually.
Clear-cut rules over minor issues like this actually reduce the amount of problems and disputes. If your cardroom wants to have a rule that 4 chips in a preflop kill pot constitutes a raise even though it is less than 1/2 the bet more, OK if you are willing to further complicate the rules book. But , as is usually the case, simplicity is probably best.
I like Randy's post alot. It seems to clear that if a player raised in this situation it is unlikely he is angle shooting (eg trying to rid the field w/just a call). The player should be told something to the effect that ,"next time you do this it will be just a call."
ALthough it seems to me discussions about the intent of the rule, or its purpose seems to beyond the scope of most floormen I have seen. And most floormen seem to think if its in accordance of the rules it is "fair." They make ruling bc they made a similar one before and they have to be "consistent."
Maybe I have been left w/the impression the casino and its floor are principally interested in keeping the games moving, and deviating from the rules bc of the subtleties might anger the rest of the table as opposed to angering one. (Although this probably isn't what they are thinking w/regard to the point of displeasing one player as opposed to the rest of the table.)
It would be nice if cardrooms would eject or even warn angleshooters but casinos are interested in getting players to continue playing and come back.
"It would be nice if cardrooms would eject or even warn angleshooters but casinos are interested in getting players to continue playing and come back."
It would seem to me one of the places to start would be to throw out the angle shooters; but what do I know, we do this and usually only have 1 or 2 games.
Randy Refeld
since Mr DS started it... When only two peaple colluding at a table (from the same team)I guess you have to wait quite a while, before the little team can pick up hands that matches eachothers (hands that are worth raising eachother with). My guess is that tree ore fore players (in the same team) at the same table can multiply the profit from the COLLUSION ITSELF. When four guys are there you could probably wery often find, at least two hands, that work well together... When I think of Mr DS example...It just seems to me that two guys can't be much to fear? Please comment!!!
How would you like to play in a game where you knew two extra cards and who held them?
Your implied assumption that profitable collusion involves raising your partner is incomplete at best. If I were to collude I would play "better hand" with my partner where rarely would we both play before the flop. This is all in addition to the obvious ability to lay down a pair of 8s when partner discarded 86o.
Multiple partners in a game can make it increasingly UN profitable since there are less cats to fry and fish to skin.
- Louie
Greetings,
Maybe this is a weird post but here goes. I have noticed after I eat, and play immediately afterwards I my results invariably suffer.
On the other hand a few times I went to eat, missed the boarding time, and had to wait 1 1/2 hours to play again I did quite well. Some of my best sessions happened in these scenarios.
Most casinos want I have played in want you to return to your seat 30/45 mins after you leave to eat. Which doesn't seem like enough...
Comments!?
ive noticed that after i eat i feel satisfied, happy, and feel like socializing. not conductive to a good poker mentality.
brad
It is common to feel tired/groggy and have difficulty concentrating after eating a meal...especially if you suffer from reactive hypoglycemia. This effect can be minimized or eliminated by choosing low-carbohydrate foods (and not over-eating) prior to playing. So enjoy a nice steak (or fish or chicken) with salad (or green vegetable), and skip the potato, bread, sugar-laden beverages, dessert, etc.
Same concept as not swimming immediately after you eat. Eating shifts the bodies focus to digestion thereby diverting some blood flow from your brain and muscles to your digestive organs. You tend to feel sluggish and not as sharp mentally as you feel at other times.
Excessive hunger should affect your results to some degree as well. Low blood sugar causes the brain to not function optimally and can also cause shakiness and irritability.
Your time frame of eating 1-2 hours before starting your session should be just about perfect.
Regards/
Eat lightly. Digestion increases the blood flow to your stomach and decreases blood flow to your brain. Hence, you are not as sharp. Try not to eat sweets and eat well balanced foods. Sweets will cause tremendous flucuations in your blood sugar and your mental acuity will suffer. In the summer and in desert climates drink fluids aggressively and stay well hydrated. Dehydration will also impair your thinking. In dry climates most people are not aware they are getting dehydrated.
Bruce
All the above makes sense to me.
Another thing I notice, especially here in California where food is comped when you play the bigger games, is that you eat a lot more when you are struggling at the tables. My guess is the average player eats twice as many calories per hour when stuck as they do when winning. Or so it seems ;-).
Regards,
Rick
It sounds hokey, but a good book to read is Managing Your Mind and Mood Through Food by Wurtman. It's got a lot of info on how different foods affect performance, eating tactics for different times of day to maximize alertness, etc. It's a good book for shift workers and poker players.
After these two questions I am done for a while until we have another vote. The first vote was about 6o-40 in favor of pursuing the subject. I am especially curious as to whether anyone will change their vote now that these four questions were discussed.
You are in the big blind with a pair of fours. Your partner, three seats to your left, limps in with J9 of hearts with no one else yet in. (Whether that is the right play is one of the questions. But for the sake of the other question, we will simply stipulate that the J9s limped.) The player to the right of the button calls. The small blind folds. You knuckle. The flop is AA8 three different suits. Three players total.
Question #1 How should you and your partner play this hand on the flop?
Question #2 If the game was honest, the J9s would have a a close decision between all three alternatives of call, raise, or fold. Does the fact that he is in partnership with the big blind who he knows has two fours make the decision clearcut? If so what should it be?
1) If the opponent is a reasonable/solid player, he would most likely have raised with hands containing an ace or a pocket pair of 8's or higher (to buy the button and isolate on the limper). Therefore, a bet from the BB and a call from the partner should convince this player to fold with little risk.
2) I believe the partnership makes it a clear call. Calling may entice other limpers (and reduces the likelihood of a preflop raise), thereby increasing the implied odds for the 44. Calling also increases the opportunities for post-flop collusion while promoting a loose image which could help to avoid suspicion.
Addendum:
1) In the unlikely event that the reasonably solid opponent raises on the flop after the partners bet and call, the partners should fold; the opponent probably has AXs. If the opponent calls on the flop, 44 should check-fold (unless you spike a 4 of course) and J9s should make one last attempt to represent an ace by betting. This is because J9s can mimic a slow-play of an ace, and J9s probably has more outs than 44 if the opponent calls. If the opponent raises on the turn, it is a clear fold.
If the opponent is a poor, somewhat loose-passive player, I believe a better course of action would be for 44 to bet and J9s to raise on the flop to drive the opponent out. If the opponent reraises, the partners can fold. If the opponent calls, the partners should check-fold the turn and check-call the river (with their best hand) if they can beat a pair of 8's.
#1 If the fours bet and you raise and the limper calls you must give up. (Unless a four comes on the turn) If he folds you have achieved your goal. You risk 3 bets to win 3 1/2. Two of those bets were yours originally. You net 1 1/2 bets. Is it worth it? I'm not sure. I guess it probably is but it just doesn't feel right to me. However, if you are going to try to win the pot I believe you must play it this way.
#2 I don't know if it makes it clearcut but you definitely want BOTH hands to see the flop.
In the first set of questions I was wrong on #1 about limping, although I think it was close. In this situation I think raising is probably slightly correct but I think limping is OK too.
Q1: Keeping in mind that this is a typical 10-20, I think think the blind should check, and his partner should bet. This puts pressure on the third man without investing too much of the team's money to steal a small pot.
If the third man raises, then the team should fold. If he calls then the blind should fold if the third man is at all a reasonable player. The benefit from collusion is that the J9 player knows that the s.b. is not slow playing ane Ace, but the third man does not know this making his decision more difficult than the team's decision. Note that the team invest's one small bet to steal the pot, where the third man would have to invest two.
Q2: pocket 4's do best with lots of players. If this is a game where an utg call often induces a "calling frenzy" then it is clearly a call for J9s. Not only does this make flopping a set pay off better, but the beneifits a partnership play are huge if 4's hit their set. For example, if they want to drive players off of their flush draws on the flop, then the set of 4's can bet and his partner can raise, or the could try of a double check-raise. Then of course, if either one of them flops a big hand, the parner can bet it for them to disguise the big hand to help the big hand get action on the end.
Steve
Till I am satisfied that I can adequately defend myself against the types of plays mentioned (and more importantly, not mentioned) I am ceasing all hold'em activity forthwith. Unfortunately, I may reach the conclusion that the best form of defense is attack.
Sorry David, I am addicted to Sims. Not sure I set them up real well, but they help my thinking, here goes:
1. Q1: Once that flop hits, the partners are dead men to the caller. I don't think someone needs a sim to tell them this. The 4's only lose a little. But the J9s gets clobbered. I even made one of the AA8 a heart. Big deal. And even shared info doesn't help this mess.
2. Q2: On a random flop, the J9s does pretty well against one caller next to the button...not great (and the sim left a lot of high cards in the deck with a calling station (pre-flop) in that cut-off-seat) ...with the partners coming out ahead, but not a great deal.
But that's the not the question you asked: You asked, should the J9s stay -- period. With no collusion, it IS very close, the sims show a good player will lose .1 bb or less. I think collusion in this case makes it profitable when it is played well: A 4 hits, T8 hits, hearts hit, etc etc, you get one or two callers, you can make the pot big enough for people to see the river, and you can control them from two seats. Point here is: You control your losses like you would anyway, but you can push winnings up a lot, especially in a loose game.
Mark
An Addendum:
I just read the other answers, suggesting that the partners can mimic an A or an 8, and then get off this quickly if they get raised.
There are two BIG problems with this:
The first problem with this is that a good player will *wait* til the turn or even river to pop you with his AJ...or A8 or other winner, and then you are fried.
The second problem is that this is EXACTLY the behavior that the software or a good player monitoring the action could detect (and probably the only behavior easily detectable) so that the 3rd or 4th time you do it, you will be stopped. Maybe, unless they don't want the scandal.
I think this is a silly place to try this kind of trick...and the correct way to use the collusion is building of large pots with one powerhouse hand.
Mark
I second Steve Fiete's answer.
I'll have a go at #1. Surely the key to this is the likelyhood of the 3rd man holding an Ace or 88. If he does not hold these he wil