Moderation Questions
The last iteration of the moderation discussion thread was a complete disaster. Numerous attempts to keep it on topic fa
I don’t really know enough about quantum mechanics to mentally map this out, but in certain theories what you’re really looking at is just one of the many possible worlds when you open the box, so if you’re standing outside of one of these possible worlds (box), what’s going on is one of those things once observed. So the box stands for all the possible worlds or just one of th
You don't really need much quantum mechanics for this discussion and it's not too difficult. In the 1920s, it became clear that the state of particles is described as a superposition of classically observable states, for something like electron spin it would be (
Maybe we are just using these terms differently, because I’m not seeing how sentience is not being studied by scientists, or why it has little value. All I mean when I use the word sentience is the capacity to have some experience such as pain, pleasure, emotion, memory. Is that something that is too hazy to be studied in principle?
No, but at that point you don't really need the concept of sentience anymore. Pain, pleasure, emotion and memory are all far more precisely defined terms, but without the baggage that sentience brings with it from the philosophy of mind.
It is the same reason why we no longer study the soul, even though the term psychology literally means study of the soul. Sure, we could just understand the concept of soul through a modern scientific understanding of the mind, but the word comes with so much baggage that we do not.
No, but at that point you don't really need the concept of sentience anymore. Pain, pleasure, emotion and memory are all far more precisely defined terms, but without the baggage that sentience brings with it from the philosophy of mind.It is the same reason why we no longer study the soul, even though the term psychology literally means study of the soul. Sure, we could just u
I don’t think because there are various sufficient but not mutually inclusive conditions that allow you to say some being is sentient that doesn’t mean sentience itself is akin to a soul. In order to “feel pain” certain conditions have to be met that aren’t just reactions to stimuli. I think you’re somewhat presupposing that the behaviorist account is the right one when you say that observed behavior is what we should focus on. If there are reasons not to accept that account independently, then unfortunately we do have to fill something in there that is not behaviorism, even if it’s a messy theory and prone to imprecision.
I don’t think because there are various sufficient but not mutually inclusive conditions that allow you to say some being is sentient that doesn’t mean sentience itself is akin to a soul. In order to “feel pain” certain conditions have to be met that aren’t just reactions to stimuli. I think you’re somewhat presupposing that the behaviorist a
I mean, there is a reason the APA dictionary basically spends 6
and its section on consciousness as understood in this context is basically a very diplomatic and polite way of saying that . You'll find some polite nods to them in introductory passages here and there, and maybe sometimes in a newspaper article some neuroscientist materialist will arrogantly holler that he has solved the mind-body problem (which he has not).If you go to the philosophy of mind however, you'll find enough books to fill a library on these subjects. That is their natural intellectual habitat.
I don’t tend to use the word consciousness because I think it’s too dependent on metaphysical commitments for people to find it mutually intelligible, but I do think sentience is a fine thing to study, especially mechanistically.
You don't really need much quantum mechanics for this discussion and it's not too difficult. In the 1920s, it became clear that the state of particles is described as a superposition of classically observable states, for something like electron spin it would be (
I tried to look up the various arguments for or against hidden variables, what superposition actually means, what superdeterminism is, etc, and I just was left with the feeling that I would have to spend a lot of time learning things I didn’t want to learn about and it would effect my life precisely zero if I didn’t learn about it. Maybe I’m wrong on both accounts but I haven’t found reason to think I an.
I find that the same people who are fascinated by discussing consciousness are also those fixated on many worlds and simulation theory and other amorphous and/or unfalsifiable ideas. It's just intellectual masturbation, but that's basically philosophy in a nutshell.
Materialism, empiricism, physicalism, scientific realism.... also not falsifiable.
I find that the same people who are fascinated by discussing consciousness are also those fixated on many worlds and simulation theory and other amorphous and/or unfalsifiable ideas. It's just intellectual masturbation, but that's basically philosophy in a nutshell.
Yes chez, that is, inter alios, you.
Now do the people who don't care about such things.
At a very high level to establish science as the ultimate arbiter of reality, perhaps. We can certainly do science without any in depth philosophical musings. Science describes the world as it is, philosophy attempts to tell us what that means. We don't need philosophy to calculate the trajectory of a boulder fired from a catapult or send a rocket to the moon.
I suppose it's progress that D2 has suddenly decided that he did manage to understand what i was I was saying after all.
It's Billy Bunteresque "I didn't eat your buns and they were horrible anyway'
Ironic as he still doesn't get much of it. The simulation and logic stuff is highly applicable and it doesn't hurt to not be ignorant about it. Also amusing that he thinks it's an insult by be thrown in the Russell, Lewis etc etc etc etc club as even the lowliest member.
I guess now I feel like we’re saying the same thing so I’m not sure what the disagreement is at this point. I’d say all of that is perfectly consistent with the standard physicalist account of what consciousness is. Maybe you think it needs to be called a simulation and I don’t, because I think it’s reducible down to something physical happening is
Yeah I dont think is some big disagreement. I don't think anything needs to be called a simulation. Just that the brain is modeling the world of which it is part and the interaction between that model and the world outside that model is via inputs/outputs.
I specifically exclude consciousness from this discussion as we don't really have handle on it. When I try to tackle consciousness I take a similar path to the one suggested by tame_deuces and reduce it to 'the problem of pain'. If we consider robotics/Ai it's obvious we can a very long way towards it being human like- but will feel pain. I don't know if it will feel pain, I dont know if that matters to how human like it can be, and I don't think we can ever know unless there are undreamt of leaps in understanding.
Yeah I dont think is some big disagreement. I don't think anything needs to be called a simulation. Just that the brain is modeling the world of which it is part and the interaction between that model and the world outside that model is via inputs/outputs.I specifically exclude consciousness from this discussion as we don't really have handle on it. When I try to tackle conscio
We could always introduce AI to the concept of pain by adding your posts to its training dataset.
At a very high level to establish science as the ultimate arbiter of reality, perhaps. We can certainly do science without any in depth philosophical musings. Science describes the world as it is, philosophy attempts to tell us what that means. We don't need philosophy to calculate the trajectory of a boulder fired from a catapult or send a rocket to the moon.
There’s no modern science without modern scientific ethical and epistemological norms, and there are no modern scientific ethical and epistemological norms without in depth philosophical musings. It’s a triumph of philosophy that it’s no longer needed in order to do science, because many people just agree on what those norms actually are for instrumental reasons.
Actually this program you’re talking about probably emerges out of a pragmatic theory of truth, which just says that the best method for acquiring truth are those that emerge from our best academic/scientific practices.
There’s no modern science without modern scientific ethical and epistemological norms, and there are no modern scientific ethical and epistemological norms without in depth philosophical musings. It’s a triumph of philosophy that it’s no longer needed in order to do science, because many people just agree on what those norms actually are for instrumental reasons.Actually this p
That's what I meant when I said that philosophy is required at a high level to establish science as the ultimate arbiter of reality. I wouldn't call that an in depth philosophical musing though.
You throw conceptual models under the wrong bus. Science uses conceptual models. They are far from just being philosophical musings.
You throw conceptual models under the wrong bus. Science uses conceptual models. They are far from just being philosophical musings.
Which models are you talking about? Many worlds is not really a scientific model, for example, it's more a philosophical one. It's not falsifiable. I don't think simulation theory is really falsifiable in most formulations either.
At a very high level to establish science as the ultimate arbiter of reality, perhaps. We can certainly do science without any in depth philosophical musings. Science describes the world as it is, philosophy attempts to tell us what that means. We don't need philosophy to calculate the trajectory of a boulder fired from a catapult or send a rocket to the moon.
No it doesn't. You’re ‘assuming’ that the boulder you see and the weight you feel are unified into one external object. Matter is a philosophical assumption, not something science discovered. A common sense assumption if you like, until we reach the extremes of QM and GR, where our everyday view of matter completely breaks down.
Which models are you talking about? Many worlds is not really a scientific model, for example, it's more a philosophical one. It's not falsifiable. I don't think simulation theory is really falsifiable in most formulations either.
Conceptual models are not scientific claims (or don't have to be) about the world. It doesn't matter a hoot if there are several that are equivalent except that it can be useful to know that they are equivalent in some or all ways.
Some may claim some conceptual model is true which may not be a scientific claim. As you know, it's not a mistake I make.
Hawkins iirc is a fan of many worlds as a conceptual model.
No it doesn't. You’re ‘assuming’ that the boulder you see and the weight you feel are unified into one external object. Matter is a philosophical assumption, not something science discovered. A common sense assumption if you like, until we reach the extremes of QM and GR, where our everyday view of matter completely breaks down.
QM and GR are science, yo.
